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ARGUMENT
Grayeyes rebuts Laws’s contentions respecting standing, laches, residency, and
fees.
Standing
Laws argues that his status as a registered voter, without more, gives him standing
– with a constitutional footing under this Court’s so-called traditional test -- and a
statutory basis in light of §20A-4-403(1)(a). Laws is incorrect.
The Traditional Test. “Judicial power,” pursuant to Art. VIII, §1, is “vested” in
our state judiciary which – as a core function -- “[d]etermine[s] controversies . . . and
questions in litigation[.]” Timpanogos Planning and Water Management Agency v.
Central Utah Water Conservancy District, 690 P.2d 562, 569 (Utah 1984). The
“procedural integrity of judicial adjudications,” in turn, depends upon the presence of
parties with “sufficient interest” and “sufficient adverseness” to ensure that all “legal and
factual issues which must be resolved will be thoroughly explored.” Terracor v. Utah Bd.
of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796, 798 (Utah 1986). Hence, a plaintiff does not have standing
under the traditional test absent a personal stake and particularized injury which is
redressable in court. See, e.g., Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of West Jordan, 2017 UT 45,
¶34. Indeed, “[s]tanding is a question of subject matter jurisdiction that ‘raise[s]
fundamental questions regarding a court’s basic authority over the dispute.’” Id. at ¶2
(citation omitted).
Voters qua voters who question the constitutionality of statutes or the eligibility of
candidates do not have the kind of personal stake or particularized injury which gives
10 | P a g e

them standing under this traditional test. See, Gregory v. Shurtleff, 2013 UT 18, ¶21 (no
standing under traditional test for voters who challenged constitutionality of statute; they
do not have “’a personal stake in [a] controversy’”) (citation omitted); Council of
Holladay City v. Larkin, 2004 UT 24, ¶27 (mayor has no standing to question electoral
notice); York v. Unqualified Washington County Elected Officials, 714 P.2d 679, 680
(Utah 1986) (resident, taxpayer, and property owner has no standing to challenge the
qualifications of persons elected as county commissioners; mere allegation of adverse
impact, without more, insufficient); Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1151 (Utah 1983)
(registered voter cannot sue to determine whether educators are eligible to serve as
legislators under Art. VI); Jenkins v. Finlinson, 607 P.2d 289, 290 (Utah 1980) (plaintiff
lacks standing to question eligibility of lawyers to serve as legislators under Art. V and
Art. VI).
Laws neither cited, discussed, nor distinguished any of these precedents in his
briefing to this Court. He instead relies upon Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780
(1983) and Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) to support his argument for standing.
But the plaintiffs in these cases, unlike Laws here, asserted a particularized injury to their
right to vote and did not rely solely on their status as holders of the franchise. In
Anderson, the Supreme Court found that a ballot access law for independent political
parties placed an actual burden on plaintiffs’ rights. Plaintiffs in Gill alleged that a state
legislative districting plan systematically diluted the voting strength of Democratic voters
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and First Amendment. In contrast, Grayeyes
showed in his opening brief that Laws, qua voter, neither alleged nor proved a distinct,
11 | P a g e

palpable harm in connection with Grayeyes’s election. Laws attempts belatedly to do this
on appeal by claiming that he is injured when Grayeyes, an allegedly ineligible candidate,
serves unlawfully in the office of commissioner. But this concern is common to the
electorate at large, an abstract injury respecting lawful governance, and nothing more.
Identical concerns were raised in York, Swan, and Finlinson, cited above, and Ryan,
referenced below. Indeed, York, as here, dealt directly with the conditions for election
and service of county commissioners. This was not enough, under all of these
precedents, to achieve standing under the traditional test.
Statutory Standing. Laws’s claim to statutory standing as a registered voter (under
§20A-4-403(1)(a)) also is unpersuasive. Standing rules are derived from Utah’s
jurisprudence respecting the separation of powers. E.g., Brown v. Division of Water
Rights, 2010 UT 14, ¶12. As such, they are designed to ensure “the procedural integrity
of judicial adjudications[,]” Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State Lands, 716 P.2d at 798, when
courts perform their core function of resolving controversies, Timpanogos Planning and
Water Management Agency v. Central Utah Water Conservancy District, 690 P.2d 562 at
569. Courts may not delegate their core functions to legislative agencies and, therefore,
presumably, to legislatures themselves. E.g., Vega v. Jordan Valley Medical Center, L.
P., 2019 UT 35, ¶15. To the same effect, the legislature may not enlarge the jurisdiction
of courts beyond constitutional bounds, Brown v. Cox, 2017 UT 3, ¶¶12-14 -- and this
principle logically applies to standing rules which set constitutional limits to the
jurisdiction or power of courts in processing disputes, Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State
Lands, 716 P.2d at 799 (“doctrine of standing limits judicial power” in order to keep the
12 | P a g e

judicial branch from becoming an “open forum for the resolution of political and
ideological disputes about the performance of government[ ]”). (Citations omitted).
These principles respecting the separation of powers have informed this Court’s
approach to statutory standing. Although there may be outlier cases appearing to take
statutes creating standing at face value, 1 for the most part, and more recently, this Court
has glossed such statutes with the constitutional criteria of the traditional test. Thus, for
example, in the seminal case of Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983), this Court
expressly held that the Utah Declaratory Judgment Statute, by itself, did not confer
standing, id. at 1148, and, accordingly, applied the traditional test to deny standing to a
“citizen, taxpayer, registered voter and parent” -- indistinguishable from the general
public – who attacked the eligibility of educators to serve as legislators under Utah’s
Constitution, id. at 1148-1152. Accord, Utah Safe to Learn-Safe to Worship Coalition,
Inc. v. State of Utah, 2004 UT 32, ¶19; Lyon v. Bateman, 228 P.2d 818, 446-447 (Utah
1951).; D.A.R. v. State of Utah, 2006 UT App. 114, ¶6.
Other cases – most of which are neither cited nor discussed in Laws’s briefing –
likewise illustrate this point. E.g., Haik v. Jones, 2018 UT 39, ¶¶17-22 (“person
aggrieved” standing under §73-3-14 glossed to require compliance with traditional test);
Morra v. Grand County, 2010 UT 21, ¶¶14-22 (“adversely affected” standing under prior

1

See, DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 848-849 (Utah 1996). But DOIT
relied upon Pike Countryside Annexation v. Vernal City, 711 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1985),
and Pike dealt with a Local Boundary Commissions Act which conferred standing upon
affected entities that were defined to include any entity “whose territory, service delivery
or revenue will be directly and significantly affected by a proposed boundary change[.]”
This language is or could be construed to be consistent with the traditional test.
13 | P a g e

version of County Land Use and Development Management Act construed in a manner
consistent with traditional test); Cedar Mountain Envtl., Inc. v. Tooele County, 2009 UT
48, ¶8 (same); In re Questar Gas Co., 2007 UT 79, ¶¶58-62 & n. 65 (statute expressly
grants utility “stockholders” right to challenge PSC order, but stockholders still must
prove standing under constitutional tests set forth in Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v.
Utah Air Quality Board, 2006 UT 74, ¶19, and cases such as Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife
Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990), respecting a distinct, palpable injury, causation, and
redressability); Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58,
¶¶5-10 (special statutory standing provisions respecting water right forfeiture proceedings
must be read in light of traditional test: “[m]any statutes are intended to benefit the public
generally, yet we do not construe them as conferring enforcement standing on the general
public[ ]”); id. at ¶¶11-28 (“interested person” and “person aggrieved” standing under
§§73-3-7(1) and 73-3-14 glossed to require showing under traditional test); Salt Lake City
v. Property Tax Div., 1999 UT 41, ¶¶15-16 (statutes authorizing governmental entities to
“sue and be sued” construed to confer standing so long as traditional test was satisfied).
See also, State ex rel. Murdock v. Ryan, 125 P. 666, 668-669 (Utah 1912) (statutory
predecessor to Rule 65B(c)(1) construed to deny standing to citizens and taxpayers who
challenged election of school district officers; plaintiffs had no “special interest,”
meaning “no interest in the subject-matter of the controversy distinct from the general
public[ ]”).2

2

Laws also argues that he has standing because Art. VIII, §3, gives the legislature power
to authorize appeals. This argument is ill-conceived, not only because §20A-4-403(1)(a)
14 | P a g e

Section 20A-4-403(1)(a) must be given a similar construction. Absent this gloss,
the statute might be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Brown v. Cox, 2017 UT 3, ¶¶12-14.
Brown struck down an earlier version of §20A-4-403 which unconstitutionally enlarged
the original jurisdiction of this Court. As noted above, similar logic should apply to
statutes which confer standing because standing also is integral to this Court’s
jurisdictional reach. Likewise, as already noted, the traditional test was forged from Art.
V and Utah’s jurisprudence respecting the separation of powers. The cases cited above
insist that, but for a standing rule like the traditional test, the “procedural integrity” of
“judicial adjudications,” a core function of Utah’s courts, may be compromised. They
also suggest that standing rules prevent courts from untoward supervision of the
executive and legislature – branches of government which ordinarily deal with “political
and ideological disputes about the performance of government.” Baird v. State, 574 P.2d
713, 717 (Utah 1978).

does not speak to appellate jurisdiction, but also because it wrongly conflates two
branches – adjudicative authority and justiciability concerns -- of subject-matter
jurisdiction. What’s more and in all events, standing is determined “’as of the time the
action is brought,’” CME v. Tooele County, 2009 UT 48, ¶10 (citation omitted), and, in
addition, may be raised for the first time or at any time (even sua sponte by this Court) in
conjunction with an appeal, Gregory v. Shurtleff, 2013 UT 18, ¶¶11 and 20. Hence, “[a]n
appellant whose standing is challenged must show not only that ‘he or she had standing
under the traditional test in the original proceeding before the district court,’ but also
‘generally must show both that he or she was a party or privy to the action below and that
he or she is aggrieved by that court’s judgment.’” Brand v. Paul, 2017 UT App 196, ¶7,
citing Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, ¶50. See also, Society of Prof. Journalists v. Bullock,
743 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah 1987) (same). Indeed, these holdings may illustrate the
principle that statutory grants of appellate jurisdiction may not “run afoul of any specific
constitutional limitation.’” Brown v. Cox, 2017 UT 3, ¶13, citing State v. Taylor, 664
P.2d 439, 442 (Utah 1983).
15 | P a g e

This observation seems particularly apt in our case where the legislature, in
§§20A-1-801, et seq., has charged the executive with supervision of the eligibility and
qualifications of candidates seeking election -- and where the judiciary, exercising its
rulemaking authority under Art. VIII, §4, in Rule 65B(c)(1), largely has concurred in that
judgment and otherwise has confined standing in such challenges to persons “aggrieved”
who can satisfy the traditional test. Section 20A-4-403(1)(a) must be interpreted in a
manner not inconsistent with these principles. If that is done, because Laws does not
satisfy the traditional test, he lacks standing and his appeal, regardless of merit, must be
dismissed.3
Laches
Grayeyes’s eligibility for county commissioner on the basis of residency was
widely discussed and thoroughly aired during the 2018 election cycle – through campaign
rhetoric, judicial proceedings, and media coverage. Hence, when voters, many of whom

3

Utah does not adhere exactly to standing requirements fashioned from Art. III of the
United States Constitution, but the traditional test largely follows these federal rules.
And under those rules, Congress may not create standing by statute which transgresses
the bounds of judicial authority. See generally, Roberts, “Article III Limits on Statutory
Standing,” 42 DUKE L. J. 1219, 1226-1229 (1993). See also, Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217-218 (1974) (plaintiffs lacked standing in suit
to enforce Art. I. §6, cl. 2, of United States Constitution treating eligibility of legislators
to serve; “[t]he only interest all citizens share in the claim advanced by respondents is
one which presents injury in the abstract . . . [The] claimed nonobservance [of the
clause], standing alone, would adversely affect only the generalized interest of all citizens
in constitutional governance[ ]”); Wagner v. Cruz, 2016 WL 1089245 (D. Utah, March
18, 2016) (Judge Parrish), aff’d, 662 Fed. Appx. 554 (10th Cir. 2016) (registered voter,
without more, lacks standing to challenge eligibility of Ted Cruz as presidential
candidate).
16 | P a g e

were Grayeyes’s neighbors at Navajo Mountain, went to the polls on November 5, 2018,
it fairly may be said that they not only decided who should be commissioner but also
expressed their opinion that Grayeyes is one of them, a resident of San Juan County.
This de facto referendum on Grayeyes’s eligibility to serve as county commissioner – by
electors who “traditionally have enjoyed an autonomy usually unreviewable by the
courts[,]” Clegg v. Bennion, 247 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1952) -- should not be overturned
for slight reasons – especially where, as here, the petitioner seeking this result has been
guilty of laches. Nevertheless, Laws resists Judge Torgerson’s laches determination with
both factual assertions and legal arguments. All of his assertions and arguments are
unavailing.
Factual assertions. Laws responds on the factual front by averring (1) that he
only had two options for challenging Grayeyes’s residency, one under §20A-9-202(5),
and another pursuant to §§20A-4-402, et seq. (2) He claims “excuse” for failure to deploy
a remedy under §20A-9-202(5) because the deadline ran out on him. (3) He further
maintains that he was counting on surrogates, his son, the county attorney, Kendall Laws,
the county clerk, John David Nielson, and a colleague, Wendy Black, to carry the ball on
residency for him until he had to resort in this proceeding to the use of §§20A-4-402, et
seq. (4) Laws finally maintains that Grayeyes suffered no prejudice from the delay in
bringing this proceeding.
These factual assertions are intended to defeat findings in the lower court of undue
delay or failure to exercise reasonable diligence under the circumstances of this case. But
those findings, unless “clearly erroneous,” cannot be overturned, e.g., In re Adoption of
17 | P a g e

Baby B., 2012 UT 35, ¶40, and Laws’s mere assertions, noted above, are insufficient to
accomplish that task. Indeed, each of his assertions is either flatly wrong or entirely
inconsistent with the evidence at trial.
(1) The number of statutory paths which Laws could have taken in order to
challenge Grayeyes’s residency is largely irrelevant. 4 The important fact is that,
whatever the number, he failed to walk down any of them on a timely basis.
(2) Laws missed §20A-9-202(5)’s deadline, but appears to offer this lapse as an
excuse rather than what it truly is, an admission against interest, especially in light of
Utah’s case law which insists that those who wish to raise election challenges must act at
the “earliest possible opportunity.” In re Cook, 882 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1994). Indeed,
by missing this deadline, the “most important step” in the electoral timeline, Utah State
Democratic Committee v. Monson, 652 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 1982), Laws may have been
barred from contesting residency altogether. Cf. Cox v. Laycock, 2015 UT 20, ¶¶21-24
and 60-66 (missing ten-day deadline for judicial review bars consideration of merits
ruling in election contest under §§20A-4-402, et seq.).
(3) Contrary to the representations in his reply brief, Laws did not testify (or
supply other evidence in support of the argument) that he looked to Nielson, Kendall, and
Black to solve the residency problem. This is nothing more than a post hoc
rationalization for inaction – and an unproven one at that. His testimony at trial suggests
that it was an unwillingness to front the legal expense of an election contest, rather than

4

In reality he had at least five such paths available, not two. These included §§20A-1801, et seq., 20A-4-402, et seq., 20A-1-404, 20A-9-202(5), and Rule 65B(c)(1).
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reliance on others, which more accurately explains his inertia in this matter. ROA at
002051.
What’s more, the argument, even if it had been supported with actual evidence, is
a non sequitur, because the Laws-Nielson-Black effort, which landed in federal court, did
not purport to resolve the residency question under state law. In other words, Laws could
not have placed any reasonable reliance that his surrogates’ efforts would resolve the
residency question. Delay in bringing the challenge in his own right, therefore, remained
unreasonable. And, in all events, the federal lawsuit was concluded in August, 2018,
giving Laws ample pre-election time to challenge Grayeyes’s residency. ROA at 002047002048 and Grayeyes’s opening brief at 30-31.
(4) Finally, Judge Torgerson made an explicit finding that Laws’s delay worked
real prejudice on the electoral system and Democratic Party. This finding is consonant
with the kind of prejudice which, according to Utah precedents, matters in laches-related
litigation involving elections. E.g., Peck v. Monson, 652 P.2d 1325, 1327-1328 (Utah
1982) (Justice Oaks, concurring) (court of equity in election contest “may refuse to
protect a private right if its exercise of jurisdiction would be prejudicial to the public
interest[ ]”) (emphasis supplied, citation omitted), adopted in In re Cook, 882 P.2d 656
(Utah 1994).
Moreover, Justice Oaks’s opinion in Peck (which the entire Court followed in
Cook) treated this prejudice as a self-evident truth (without adverting to any evidence
below): Political parties -- and candidates like Grayeyes who are in privity with those
parties -- spend dollars, time, and effort during the course of a campaign. These parties,
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their candidates, the electorate at large, and the democratic process itself all suffer if these
efforts come to naught on account of post-election litigation.

The Utah cases also note

as implicitly unfair – as a circumstance which is inherently prejudicial to winning
candidates – the fact that, in election contests, those guilty of laches will receive an unfair
advantage, “two shafts to their bow,” as the Clegg opinion put it.
In our case, actual evidence was introduced before Judge Torgerson – for example,
the legal expense ($324,819.85) which Grayeyes incurred during his fight over the
summer of 2018 to get on the ballot and conduct a campaign – in support of the element
of prejudice. ROA at 001245-001262. It is obvious that, if Laws had acted, at the earliest
possible opportunity, and objected under §20A-9-202(5), forcing everyone concerned to
sort the issue of residency at that juncture – giving Grayeyes an opportunity to resolve
that issue, by amendment to his declaration of candidacy, as the statute permits, clarifying
that, at a minimum, his stopping at the home of his daughter and sister for 80 percent of
each year would satisfy whatever statute on residency might be deemed applicable – all
of that expense and the ensuing hubbub over these protracted proceedings could have
been avoided. If this doesn’t deserve the name of prejudice, nothing ever will. On
appeal, this evidence respecting prejudice may be referenced to sustain Judge
Torgerson’s decision. E.g., Salt Lake City v. Carrera, 2015 UT 73, ¶6.
Legal arguments. Having nowhere to go on the facts, Laws attempts to circumvent
laches with a farrago of claims about (1) equity versus law, (2) statutes of limitation, (3)
electoral challenges based on eligibility as opposed to qualifications, and (4) “unclean
hands.” All of these arguments fail.
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(1) Laws says that laches only applies in equitable proceedings and that election
contests are legal not equitable in character, citing Harries v. McCrea, 219 P. 533 (Utah
1923). But Harries was rendered obsolete by the judicial reformation which abolished
distinctions between law and equity and permitted our courts, under the rules of
procedure, to entertain issues pertaining to both in the same proceeding. E.g., Borland v.
Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1987). Since then, this Court has noted that election
contests are proceedings in equity, e.g., Ellis v. Swenson, 2000 UT 101, ¶23, and
equitable remedies may be applied in the context of such proceedings, e.g., Cox v.
Laycock, 2015 UT 20, ¶¶23, 24, 60-66 (issuance of extraordinary writ in election contest
under §§20A-4-402, et seq., is exercise of equity power of Utah courts which power is
subject to the doctrine of laches). Likewise, Justice Oaks made clear that Utah’s
judiciary, in election contests, sitting as “courts of equity,” may overrule private concerns
in deference to the public interest. Peck v. Monson, 652 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah 1982).
Indeed, it could hardly be otherwise when our Declaration of Rights may be read to
guarantee fair elections as a form of fundamental right, Art. I, §§27 and 17, and our case
law has developed “to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently[ ]”).
Utah Safe to Learn-Safe to Worship Coalition, Inc. v. State, 2004 UT 32, ¶34 (emphasis
added, citation omitted).
(2) By the same token, Laws insists that laches should be given limited play
where, as here, a statute of limitation applies. But case law makes clear that the
application of laches turns on the circumstances of each case, e.g., Estate of Price v.
Hodkin, 2019 UT App 137, ¶18, that the prejudice entailed by undue delay in election
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contexts where democratic expectations of citizen voters otherwise might be overturned
is especially acute, e.g., Soules v. Kauaians for Nukolii Campaign Committee, 849 F.2d
1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1988), and therefore pre-election resolution of such disputes may be
enforced notwithstanding any applicable limitations period, e.g., Ellis v. Swenson, 2000
UT 101, ¶23. See also, Insight Assets, Inc. v. Farias, 2013 UT 47, ¶18 (laches may apply
notwithstanding existence and satisfaction of limitations period); Veysey v. Nelson, 2017
UT App 77, ¶7 (same); Estate of Price v. Hodkin, 2019 UT App 137, ¶15 (same).
(3) Laws makes the same argument in a different form when he says that the
statutory basis for election contests allows for challenges to the eligibility of a candidate
pre-election and the qualifications of that same candidate post-election, and that this
distinction matters insofar as the timing of a challenge is concerned. Whether this may
be an important distinction in some election contests, it makes no difference in ours.
Laws focused entirely on what he considered to be the untruth respecting residency on
the declaration of candidacy submitted by Grayeyes. All his evidence (the little there
was) centered on what Grayeyes said – for durational residency purposes – i.e. preelection purposes - on that document. Deputy Turk used the coordinates on the
declaration to find Grayeyes’s homestead. A social worker testified about visiting that
home sometime before the election. Laws himself testified about his visit to that home
during the campaign. There was not a scintilla of evidence presented concerning the
applicable legal standard or related factual circumstances respecting Grayeyes’s
residence once he was installed in office.

22 | P a g e

What’s more, the relevant statutes – whether addressing pre- or post-election
residency requirements for county commissioners – as well as the controlling cases –
show that this is a distinction without a difference, especially insofar as the logic of
laches is concerned. Sections 17-16-1 and 17-53-202 all frame their residency
requirements in terms of “eligibility” for office.5 Section 17-16-1(1)(b), the only statute
which Laws could invoke, treats residency in relation to the year prior to filing a
declaration of candidacy. Section 17-53-202’s provisions deal with a person’s status
when assuming office and the year prior, but only in terms of voter registration, not
actual residency, and Grayeyes’s status as a registered voter went uncontested at the trial
before Judge Torgerson.
(4) Laws finally claims that Grayeyes has “unclean hands” and, therefore, cannot
raise the defense of laches. Grayeyes’s “unclean hands,” according to Laws, consists of
lying about his residence on his declaration of candidacy. Laws did not raise this
argument in the lower court. Nor did he present any evidence that Grayeyes lacked an

5

This language is in the title of the statutes, but such titles may be used by courts as
interpretive tools in understanding legislative intent. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Percival, 962
P.2d 796, 800 (Utah 1998). See also, Clegg v. Bennion, 247 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1952)
(candidate “disqualified” for want of residency in legislative district: “In this case any
question of ineligibility or disqualification existed, if at all, on July 12, 19 days before the
convention to which the declarants’ names were to be presented. During that period the
matter could have been litigated. Seeking relief 13 days after the convention had met,
accepted and nominated the declarants, impresses as not being within that reasonable
time contemplated in equity in such cases. It would seem rather to provoke an unfair
assurance that . . . losing candidates have two shafts to their bow, while disfranchising
delegates to party conventions which traditionally have enjoyed an autonomy usually
unreviewable by the courts [ ]”) (emphasis and elisions added).
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honest belief that the GPS coordinates which he marked on his declaration of candidacy
were in fact his legal residence. Judge Torgerson made no finding of fact on this point.
Laws therefore has waived any “unclean hands” opposition to the doctrine of laches, and
it cannot be raised for the first time on this appeal. E.g., Meyer v. Deluke, 457 P.2d 966,
969 (Utah 1969).
Residency
Grayeyes is 74 years old and has lived his entire life on Paiute Mesa, Navajo
Mountain, San Juan County. The evidence establishing Grayeyes’s residency at this
place was overwhelming. He has a homestead on Paiute Mesa, Navajo Mountain. He
runs cattle there, and, indeed, his permit to run cattle, under the regulatory requirements
of the Navajo Nation, signifies his right to “ownership” of that very homestead.
Acquaintances and family know that this is his homestead; they have paid him visits
there, held family celebrations there, and branded the family cattle at that spot. His
extended family, the Grayeyes clan, too numerous to count, lives in close proximity,
spread over the same area. For upwards of 80 percent of each year, as an Elder and
elderly gentleman, he stays with a daughter and a sister who have homes near that
location. He works nearby as a chapter official and school board member in the Navajo
Nation. For approximately 30 years, he has been a registered voter and has voted in that
precinct, a fact which, under the statute relied upon by Laws in our case, creates a
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presumption of residency which may be rebutted only through clear and convincing
evidence.6
This evidence is sufficient to satisfy the durational residency requirement found at
§17-16-1(1)(b), even if that statute’s reference to “residency” must be understood in
relation to the “fixed habitation” and “single location” language of §20A-2-105(1)(a).
This was demonstrated with copious citations to the ROA, at pages 49 to 60 of our
opening brief.7

6

The factual statements in this paragraph are supported by citations to the ROA in our
opening brief. Laws did not carry his burden of persuasion, under this Court’s marshaling
doctrine or otherwise, in contesting these facts. See, State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶¶4142.
7

Laws’s rebuttal of this showing was thin to non-existent. It consisted of irrelevant or
inconclusive testimony from four witnesses who, on approximately five different days,
visited the home in question when Grayeyes was absent. But each of the visits occurred
outside §17-16-1(1)(b)’s temporal orbit and signified nothing more than the possibility
that Grayeyes, on those occasions, was avoiding a visit from home teachers or attending a
meeting of the local grazing committee.
One witness, Mr. Bitsinnie, referenced a dispute between Grayeyes and his nephew,
Harrison Ross, over ownership of the home, but no foundation was laid concerning the
property laws which are peculiar to Native Americans on the Navajo Reservation, and, on
cross-examination, Bitsinnie admitted that he had nothing more than hearsay information
respecting whatever controversy actually may have existed. Grayeyes’s daughters, on the
other hand, testified affirmatively that Ross was a squatter who had no claim to the
family home and that their father was giving him a wide berth in order to avoid any
appearance that he was using his official position as a chapter representative for personal
leverage in the resolution of that situation.
Indeed, by offering Bitsinnie as a witness, Laws reinforced the fact of Grayeyes’s
residency under §§17-1-16(1)(b) and 20A-2-105(1)(a). The very existence of this
putative controversy with a close relative over a homestead location at Navajo Mountain
is relevant to show Grayeyes’s presence as a stakeholder in the county. And his
daughters’ testimony -- that Grayeyes did not press the issue to the point of litigation in
order to avoid the appearance that he was taking advantage of an official position as
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Laws’s reply brief does not gainsay the fact that Grayeyes lived somewhere in San
Juan County during the time necessary for durational residency. 8 But he appears to insist
that this isn’t good enough. Laws apparently argues that, in order to achieve durational
residency under §17-16-1-(1)(b), Grayeyes, not only had to live in a fixed habitation in a
single location within the meaning of §20A-2-105(1)(a), but also that this principal place
of residence must be identical with the GPS coordinates which Grayeyes marked on his
declaration of candidacy when it was filed pursuant to chapter 9 of title 20A. However,
both of Laws’s propositions in this regard are wrong.
Durational residency requirements under §17-16-1(1)(b) aren’t tied to the voter
residency language – a “principal place of residency” in a fixed habitation in a single
location – of §20A-2-105(1)(a). Section 20A-2-105(2) makes this clear by providing that

chapter representative -- highlights Grayeyes’s sensitivity to local opinion. A person
without close contact and enduring ties at Navajo Mountain, somebody with living
arrangements which are geographically remote to that region, would care less about his
neighbor’s sensibilities in this regard. In addition, Grayeyes’s caution -- to ensure that a
property dispute didn’t become a breach of the peace and to guarantee that ethical
governance under tribal law took precedence over personal interests -- show his
subjection to legal rules in a local community, a factor which this Court has identified as
significant in determinations of residency. See, Dodge v. Evans, 716 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah
1985).
Nevertheless, Laws’s reply brief states repeatedly that Harrison Ross “owned” the
Grayeyes homestead. There is no evidence supporting this assertion and Judge
Torgerson did not make any finding to this effect. Ross’s occasional, interloping
occupancy of the Grayeyes homestead is not proof of ownership, and any dispute over
either ownership or occupancy demonstrates Grayeyes’s bona fide claim to that
homestead and confirms his intention of keeping it.
8

Laws apparently has abandoned the fiction that Grayeyes lived in a mobile home in
Page, Arizona.
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the single location/fixed habitation language of §20A-2-105(1)(a) applies only in title
20A and not in title 17, a result which is reinforced by this Court’s reasoning in Pugh v.
Draper City, 2005 UT 12, ¶9 (election law provisions of title 20A do not apply to
election related statutes in title 10).9
In addition, candidates for the office of commissioner must meet four eligibility
requirements. Three of the four, §§17-53-202(1), 17-53-202(2), and 17-16-1(1)(c), are
based upon voter registration (which, in Grayeyes’s case, was undisputed), while the
fourth, §17-16-1(1)(b), speaks in terms of residency generally. Reading §17-16-1(1)(b)
in terms of voter registration under §20A-2-105 would render §17-16-1(1)(b)
superfluous, an interpretation which Utah’s cases tell us to avoid wherever possible. E.g.,
J. Pochynok Co., Inc. v. Smedsrud, 2005 UT 39, ¶15 ("'statutory enactments are to be so
construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and . . . interpretations
are to be avoided which render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd[ ]'"),
quoting from Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980).
Finally, because the residency requirements for county commissioners and the
principal place of residence language in the voter registration statute serve entirely
distinct purposes, they should not be conflated. See, e.g., Utah Department of
Transportation v. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, ¶22 (goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect
to legislative intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve). Durational

9

Nor can this construction of §17-16-1(1)(b) be harmonized with §17-16-1(2), which
invokes the voter registration residency statute only for purposes of determining when a
commissioner, after election, moves, thereby creating a vacancy in that office.
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residency requirements like §17-16-1(1)(b) are purposed to ensure that voters will have
time to become acquainted with candidates for office and that candidates for office will
have time to understand the minds of their constituents. E.g., Note, “Durational
Residence Requirements for Candidates,” 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 357 (1973).
Residency provisions for purposes of voter registration enable county clerks to prepare
official roles on a precinct by precinct basis, §§20A-2-101(1)(d), 20A-2-102, 20A-3a102, 20A-5-401, 20A-5-204, 20A-5-205, 20A-5-206, thereby facilitating ballot
preparation, as well as cross-checking and counting at polling locations, §§20A-5-405,
20A-3a-203, 20A-3a-205, 20A-5-605. A durational residency requirement does not care
where a candidate may live in a county, so long as that candidate lives somewhere in that
county. A voter on the other hand must live in his precinct in order properly to facilitate
the mechanics of an election.10
But, as noted above, this commonsense construction of the statutory requirements
does not appear to satisfy Laws. He is obsessed with the GPS coordinates which
Grayeyes listed on the declaration of candidacy and maintains that, absent proof
Grayeyes owned a physical habitat at this very location, identical with the marks placed
on this particular document, he cannot be deemed a resident for purposes of §17-161(1)(b).11 This view is misguided for at least three reasons.

10

This same distinction has figured in constitutional analyses which have sustained
longer durational residency requirements for candidates but shortened those for voters.
See generally, Mazo, “Residency and Democracy: Durational Residency Requirements
From the Framers to the Present,” 43 FLA. STATE U. L. REV. 611 (2017).
11

There are no street addresses at Navajo Mountain and the Navajo Reservation.
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First, Grayeyes doesn’t have to “prove” anything. Because Grayeyes is registered
to vote at that location, the statute which Laws invokes creates a presumption that
Grayeyes has his principal place of residence there. It is Laws’s burden of persuasion to
show otherwise by clear and convincing evidence, something he failed to do in the lower
court. §20A-2-105(7).
Second, Grayeyes doesn’t have to “own” that principal place of residence. By
implying as much, Laws comes close to arguing for a violation of Art. IV, §7, which
eliminates the ownership of property as a qualification to vote or otherwise participate in
the electoral process. The statute which Laws invokes treats the ownership of realty as but
one of many factors to be weighed in determining residency for voting purposes. §20A-2105(4)(g). Residency for voting purposes, in states with statutes not unlike §20A-2-105,
can be any fixed location: “Thus, a hotel, shelter for the homeless, or even a park bench
will be sufficient.” Fischer v. Stout, 741 P.2d 217, 221 (Alaska 1987), citing Pitts v.
Black, 608 F.Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) and Collier v. Menzel, 221 Cal. Rptr. 110 (Cal.
1985).
Third, Utah’s elections code doesn’t say that residency for purposes of §17-161(1)(b) must be identical with the address given on a declaration of candidacy under
chapter 9 of title 20A, and, indeed, any statement to that effect would collide with this
Court’s holding in Pugh. Likewise, a requirement that these addresses remain constant
throughout an election cycle could not be squared with §20A-3-303.3(7) which allows
Grayeyes qua voter to change precincts – within the same county – so long as he
accomplishes this change within 30 days preceding a particular election, §§20A-229 | P a g e

102.5(b) and 20A-2-101(1)(b). In short, in Laws’s view, once a candidate filed his
declaration, he could not change addresses within the same county until after the election
– even though this restriction on movement nowhere is articulated in the elections code –
runs counter to the statutes cited immediately above -- would actually defeat the purpose
of durational residency requirements to give candidates wider acquaintance with voters
county-wide -- and might offend the right to travel which has been tied to voting
protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338-342 (1972).
If we look beyond Laws’s red herring, it is easy to see that Grayeyes had the
requisite residency in San Juan County. At a minimum, Grayeyes lived with a daughter
and a sister, in physical habitats with fixed coordinates in the same precinct at Navajo
Mountain, for 80 percent of the time contemplated under the statute – and, to the extent
necessary, he could amend his voter registration or candidacy declaration to reflect that
circumstance12 – or, as in other states, be deemed to have “elected” one of these locations
(as among the several stopping places he used in San Juan County over the years) as a
“principal place of residence.”13 Either scenario fits well with the facts established in the

12

This possibility specifically is contemplated in §20A-9-202(5), and, had Laws objected
to Grayeyes’s declaration of candidacy on a timely basis, recourse to that statutory option
might have saved everybody from this debacle of a contest.
13

This procedure, which has been adopted in New York, is discussed in Wit v. Berman,
306 F.3d 1256 (2d Cir. 2002): “This pragmatic approach lessens the burdens on
registrars, who in most cases need only verify an address, and on people like appellants,
who otherwise might be turned down at both places and have to go to court in order to be
able to vote anywhere.” Id. at 1262. See also, Wilkie v. Delaware County Bd. of
Elections, 865 N.Y.S.2d 739, 741 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., App. Div., 3d Dept., 2008) (voter may
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lower court, and Judge Torgerson’s ruling, fairly read, appears to adopt something like
this application of the relevant statutes to the circumstances of our case.
Fees
Bad Faith Doctrine. Invoking §78B-5-825, Judge Torgerson held that a finding of
some merit, standing alone, was dispositive on this point. But Stewart v. Utah Public
Service Commission, 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994) required Judge Torgerson to
consider a wide range of equitable factors – oppression, vexatious stubbornness, spite,
wantonness – itemized with the disjunctive “or” – in assessing whether Grayeyes should
be allowed fees under the bad faith doctrine. The cases cited by Laws, including the dicta
in Injured Workers Association of Utah v. State, 2016 UT 21, ¶34 n. 7, reflect rather than
oppose this approach. The Court, in footnote 7, does not “foreclose” the legislature from
designating “statutory attorney fee awards.” But this is nothing more than what this
Court, under the judge-made American Rule, always has allowed pursuant to its inherent
power. Indeed, judicial supremacy over fee awards is implicit in the phrasing, “does not
foreclose.” Footnote 7 may permit statutory fee awards, through judicial grace, but it does
not authorize the legislature, in §78B-5-825 or elsewhere, to overrule or curtail equitable
fee doctrines arising from the inherent power of this Court. This case accordingly should
be remanded so that all facts, including those bearing upon oppression, vexation, spite,

have two residences and choose one for election purposes so long as he has “legitimate,
significant and continuing attachments” to that location) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
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and wantonness, as well as merit, may be considered before determining whether an
award of fees under the bad faith doctrine is appropriate.
Private Attorney General Doctrine (PAGD). Judge Torgerson deferred to §78B-5825.5 and held that he could not award fees under the PAGD. Because he refused to cross
this statutory threshold, anything said about the merits of Grayeyes’s application for
attorney fees was obiter dicta and, moreover, in all events, went unsupported in a record
which, because of the pre-emptive effect of the constitutional bar, had not been
developed. There was no point, after all, in rendering an advisory opinion on the merits of
a claim that §78B-5-825.5 – which he upheld as constitutional – clearly extinguished.
This reading of Judge Torgerson’s ruling is confirmed by the fact that, had he truly and
fully weighed the non-constitutional merits of the claim itself, he must have sustained it
in view of compelling precedents where public interest fees are awarded in election
contests involving the right to vote and the fundamental right of San Juan County’s
citizens to elect a candidate of their choice. E.g., Utahns for Better Dental Health-Davis,
Inc. v. Davis County Clerk, 2007 UT 97, ¶¶9-10.14 What’s more, Laws’s argument, raised
for the first time on this appeal, that only petitioners and not respondents are entitled to
fee awards under the PAGD, an argument unsupported by logic and contradicted by the

14

The public interest aspects of candidate selection, election outcomes, and rights to vote
in view of residency requirements are so obvious that some jurisdictions, such as Alaska,
have codified variations of the PAGD in their rules of court. See, e.g., Dansereau v.
Ulmer, 955 P.2d 916 (Alaska 1998) (gubernatorial contest), Hunsicker v. Thompson, 717
P.2d 358 (Alaska 1986) (school board election), Lake & Peninsula Borough v. Oberlatz,
329 P.3d 214 (Alaska 2014) (voter residency challenge).
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facts of Utah’s leading case, would have been addressed. 15 The upshot is that Grayeyes
has shown that §78B-5-825.5 is unconstitutional, and has not waived argument about the
application of the PAGD on this appeal because the merits of that claim were not
addressed sufficiently in the lower court. The fee ruling, therefore, should be reversed
and the case remanded so that Judge Torgerson, in the first instance, and free from
constitutional uncertainty, may determine whether the PAGD properly may be applied to
Grayeyes’s application for attorney fees.
CONCLUSION
Grayeyes respectfully requests that Laws’s appeal be denied and that Grayeyes’s
cross-appeal be granted with a remand to Judge Torgerson for further proceedings in
connection with the application for attorney fees.
Dated this 11th day of July, 2020.
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Alan L. Smith
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15

In Stewart, a utility petitioned for a rate increase. The ratepayers (who obtained the
PAGD award) responded to that petition and ultimately prevailed.
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